

**Houston Area
Model United Nations
Specialized Committee**



UNFCCC - COP28

Chair | Dean Zach

Specialized Committee Background Guide

Houston Area Model United Nations 48

February 2-3, 2023

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Note to Delegates



Delegates,

I'm Dean Zach, and I'll be serving as your UNFCCC committee chair for HAMUN 48. Right now, I'm a junior at Trinity University (in San Antonio) majoring in English, minoring in creative writing, and (possibly) double-majoring in political science.

A few important notes about this year's committee: although this committee's name is (technically) UNFCCC, this committee will be structured as the 28th Conference (COP28) of all countries who are Parties to the UNFCCC treaty, which will in reality take place in Dubai in November 2023. As a result, this is not a standard committee, nor a crisis committee, but a specialized committee. All that means is that committee sizes may be a bit smaller and some specialized rules of procedure which are specific to UN climate change conferences may apply. In general we'll operate just like a standard committee though, taking actions through resolutions, using standard procedure, and all that stuff. See more on this below.


As a final note, I'm really excited to see everyone in-person again!

Dean Zach

He/him/his

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Changes to regular parliamentary procedure

In general, this committee will use the same rules of procedure as a regular standard committee—we will use points and motions to speak, resolutions to get things done, etc. As a specialized committee, however, there will also be a few extra rules of procedure and also a few extra powers which countries will have the opportunity to use to their advantage. (Assuming the countries that can use them to their advantage read this...)

- ❖ **European Union (EU) member states, if all choose to do so, can consolidate their voting power (so that they have one vote counting six times).** This is in accordance with how the real conferences work, in which EU member states send their own delegates, but also negotiate bloc-wide emissions goals and vote as a bloc. This choice must be submitted in writing to the dais with the 6 EU states as signatories.
- ❖ The **4 member states** who have yet to submit updated NDCs (they know who they are) can do so in writing at any time during the conference using the motion “motion to submit NDC.”



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What is climate change?

If you don't know what climate change is, here's a "brief" explainer.

Climate change refers to both the heating of the Earth's atmosphere as a result of fossil-fuel burning, agriculture, and other human activities, and the wide-ranging effects caused by that heating.

Although, climate change has many different human causes, the primary cause of global heating is the **burning of fossil fuels like coal, oil, or natural gas.**

When these fossil fuels are burned—in cars, in power plants, in factories, in furnaces—they release **greenhouse gases**, which are named that because when released into the atmosphere they have a "**greenhouse effect**" of absorbing and re-emitting heat in Earth's atmosphere, just like a blanket traps body heat. The greenhouse gas that is released in most fossil fuel emissions is **carbon dioxide**, or CO₂, but there is also **methane**, or CH₄, which is better at trapping

heat but often overlooked (and discussed in Topic B), and also other minor GHGs.

Other causes of global warming include deforestation (in which CO₂ and methane are released after trees are cut down and burned), agriculture (in which CO₂ and methane are released by bacteria and livestock), and cement production (which relies on a chemical reaction that releases CO₂ as a byproduct).

There are too many effects of global warming to be listed here. Some are obvious and well-publicized—polar ice melt, rise in sea levels, loss of biodiversity, stronger hurricanes and thunderstorms, more floods, wildfires, droughts and heat waves. Others are arguably less well-known, but just as destructive—**spread of tropical diseases, more water scarcity, more famine, more climate refugees, more permafrost melt, coral reef bleaching, ocean acidification.** Oftentimes the effects become causes themselves, as when permafrost melt causes methane release, which causes more permafrost melt, and so on. Often the effects have their own other effects, in what the U.S. DoD calls a "**threat multiplier.**"



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Climate change, cont.

Luckily and unluckily, proposed solutions to climate change are just as manifold as climate change's effects. “Clean” energy, particularly solar, wind, hydroelectric, and sometimes nuclear power, has gotten exponentially cheaper in recent years. Better battery technology has led to the more widespread adoption of electric vehicles (which are only clean when they run on clean power grids.) Carbon capture, though largely unproven, is perhaps promising, but geoengineering solutions like cloud-seeding or sulfur dioxide less so.

A brief geopolitical history: human-caused climate change arguably began in full force with the Industrial Revolution, which itself began in Western Europe, the US and Canada (although for a time Industrial Era carbon emissions had little effect on temps, because emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO₂), a

byproduct of burning coal that harms the respiratory system and creates acid rain but also provides a short-term cooling effect, were not yet regulated and curbed warming.) As a result, Western Europe, the US, and other developed nations of the world like Japan, historically account for most global emissions. **Increasingly, however, the so-called “BASIC” or “BRICS” nations—Brazil, South Africa, India, world’s no. 1 emitter China, and Russia—**have begun to account for most emissions, and less developed countries like Nigeria or Indonesia are now industrializing. As a result, there is no one single actor at which to point the blame for climate change, making the process of resolving the crisis all the more challenging.



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Background Information

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, at a time when climate change action was beginning to seem more urgent. (It should be noted that the UNFCCC is a **treaty**: not a convention like ComicCon, but more like the Geneva Conventions, (which were treaties). Therefore, the correct name of this committee is COP28 (Conference of Parties 28), but we're using UNFCCC for convenience.)

UNFCCC entered into force in 1994 and is the leading international treaty on the environment. **197 parties, including all UN Member States**, have ratified the Convention to date (**although not all are parties** to some of the agreements, like the Kyoto and Paris Agreements, that came out of later UNFCCC meetings)

[Per the convention text itself](#), the main purpose of the UNFCCC is to, with all deliberate speed, “stabiliz[e] greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-caused] interference with the climate system.” Today, UNFCCC consists of 28 different bodies. Notable ones include the Bureau, which deals with implementing the terms of the treaty, the Secretariat, which works with UN leadership, and others like the COP President, who is appointed annually to preside over Conferences of the Parties. If you're interested, you can [see all of the bodies here](#). The most important UNFCCC body, though, and the one we are representing here, is the **Conference of the Parties**.

Under Article 7.2 of UNFCCC, **Conference of the Parties (COP)** is the absolute “decision-making body” of the Convention and consists of all parties to the Convention, who meet every year in “COPs” to reassess their climate goals.

Essentially, COPs serve as annual check-in meetings between all states that are parties to the Convention. (COPs are to the UNFCCC as sessions of Congress are to the Constitution.) The first COP meeting, COP1, was held in 1995 in Bonn, Germany. We are here at COP28 in Dubai. (The COP28 president is [UAE climate change minister Miriam Almheiri](#), and, for the purposes of this committee, this position will be filled by the chair and dais.)

Arguably some of the most important international climate agreements to date have emerged from COPs. For example, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC (Kyoto Protocol) was adopted at COP3 in 1997 and became effective in February 2005. The protocol was the first to create concrete, binding targets which countries were obligated to reduce their carbon emissions to. (For example, [Denmark pledged to cut its fuel emissions 21% by 2010 from 1990 levels](#).) It should be noted, however, that **these goals only applied to developed nations**, that the first commitment period expired in 2012, and that **global emissions still rose by 32% from 1990-2010 despite the agreement** (in reality, Denmark cut its emissions only by 7%).

As a result, many regarded the Kyoto Protocol as insufficient, lacking in urgency, and overdue for replacement.

The Paris Agreement: COP21

The Paris Agreement in 2015, the world's most important climate agreement to date, built upon the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol to end the distinction between developed and developing countries, and thus **calls on all countries to reduce emissions**, not just developed ones. Under the agreement, all parties must, every five years, submit reports of their carbon emissions (called Nationally Determined Contributions, or NDCs) and document the progress they've made toward achieving their NDCs, a so-called "global stocktake" every 5 years (the last one being 2022, the next 2027). In this way, countries are supposed to hold each other accountable—failing to meet one's goals is supposed to be embarrassing, and meeting them a triumph over one's rivals. Unlike in the Kyoto Protocol, though, states set their own goals, and targets are nonbinding.

The Paris Agreement also contains ["supportive" language on loss and damage](#), which is often overshadowed by an infamous clause inserted by developed countries which states that,

in essence, [no nation, even major emitters, can be held “legally responsible” for climate damage.](#)

Other recent COPs of note: 15, 19, 26, 27

Arguably one of the highest-profiles examples of **diplomatic failure** to combat climate change happened at **COP15, in Copenhagen in 2009.**

COP15 in Copenhagen is perhaps a good model for what an unsuccessful committee at HAMUN48 would look like (or maybe, depending on your country’s position, a successful one). The biggest achievement of COP15 was the **Copenhagen Accord, a nonbinding agreement drafted by the BASIC bloc (Brazil, South Africa, India, China)** which contains no legally binding emissions targets and agrees only that “action should be taken” to limit warming to 2° C. Failure to create a binding treaty was alternately blamed on developed nations, some of whom negotiated only with each other, and developing nations, who were accused of stonewalling to protect economic growth.

COP19, in Warsaw in 2013, was notable for the walkout of developing country delegates over

the \$100 billion pledge (discussed later), as well as the establishment of the Warsaw Intl. Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), which promoted dialogue over the “loss and damage” issue and preceded later, more substantive agreements over “loss and damage.”

COP26, in Glasgow, Scotland in Nov. 2021, resulted in the creation of the **Glasgow Pact**, a landmark agreement, the so-called **“coal, cars, cash, and trees”** agreement, in which parties pledged to limit coal consumption and deforestation, phase in electric vehicles, and establish a framework for financing climate projects in developing nations. The Glasgow Pact was marred, however, by a last-minute wording change **from “phase out” coal to “phase down coal”** initiated by China and India. It also led to the [Glasgow Dialogue](#), in which countries agreed to meet once a year until 2024 to merely **“discuss” the possibility of “funding ... to avert, minimize, and address loss and damage from climate change.”**

Finally, the most recent and arguably, for our purposes, most important COP, was **COP27 in Egypt in Nov. 2022.** This COP will be discussed in further detail in the section on Topic A.



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Topic A: Climate reparations

The term “reparations” is most often used in the context of wartime, and most often means money that is paid by one state to another to repair the latter state’s war damages (like the reparations Germany paid to France and the UK after World War I).

If one accepts the premise that climate change is an urgent, warlike emergency, then you might think that reparations should be given to the countries on the front lines (the countries most harmed by climate change) by the countries that put them there—like the army giving money to a war widow. On the other hand, you might think that such reparations would be harmful and counterproductive and prevent developed countries from investing their money in better, more valuable ways, like investing in domestic green energy.

In any case, debates over **the reparations fund for loss and damage, climate finance**, and the so-called “**\$100 billion pledge**” rage today and require urgent action at COP28 from the UNFCCC.

Essentially, delegates should answer the call from COP27 to “refine the details” of the COP27 reparations fund by establishing **who exactly pays reparations, who exactly receives them, and how disputes in the two areas should be resolved**. Delegates should also address, among other things if they so choose, **climate finance** and what projects should be invested in, and other issues related to **loss and damage**.

In 2022, the Pakistani writer Mohammad Hanif published an op-ed titled [“Pakistan’s Biblical Floods and the Case for Climate Reparations.”](#) Hanif wrote in the immediate aftermath of the summer 2022 Pakistan floods, [which caused \\$30 billion in damage](#), killed more than 1,800, inundated up to a third of the country [by some estimates](#), and was [driven by a hotter atmosphere](#) that could store more water vapor and melt more glaciers



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For **Hanif**, because [scientists agree](#) that global warming was responsible for making the 2022 floods worse, those who primarily caused global warming are also responsible for making the 2022 floods worse, and so therefore those who primarily caused global warming (developed nations) must pay for the losses and damages caused by their carbon emissions. Ultimately, **Hanif argues that what Pakistanis “need and want is compensation for climate-related loss and damage,” and calls on “Western governments” to meet this need.** Hanif puts it starkly:

Pakistan generates less than one per cent of the world’s carbon emissions. We are quite good at blaming ourselves and our governments for our misfortunes, but global warming is overwhelmingly caused by rich folks living thousands of miles away, mostly in the West, by people who know that their air-conditioned homes and midsize cars and Caribbean holidays have snatched away the home and livelihood of someone in a village in Pakistan. ... they and their governments can and should pay for what they helped to destroy.

On the other hand, **US climate envoy John Kerry**, when asked about the issue [in Sept. 2022](#), was skeptical (or perhaps realistic) about the feasibility and efficacy of a fund to reimburse countries for their climate losses and damages:

And we have a limited, you know, we’re not—you tell me the government in the world that has trillions of dollars, cause that’s what it costs. ... the money we need right now needs to go to adaptation. It needs to go to building resilience. It needs to go to the technology that’s gonna save the planet. ... **You can’t just set up a facility in six weeks. Let’s be serious about this. We gotta talk about how we’re going to do it. How are you going to measure it? How do you allocate? What do you allocate? Where’s the money coming from?**



[In Oct. 2022](#), however, when a COP27 resolution taking the first steps to establish a fund (see below!) was looking more like reality, [Kerry expressed more openness to the idea](#), although with reservations: **“How do you do this in a way that actually produces money, gets a system in place? We’re totally in favor of that.”**

Loss and Damage: The COP27 Fund

For 30+ years small island states had agitated for the creation of a loss and damage fund (as recounted in [this 2022 Carbon Brief article](#)). At COP27 in Egypt this past November, countries finally answered small island states and Mohammad Hanif’s call, and, in a landmark development, [created](#), over some objections, **the first fund** entirely dedicated **to remedying the loss and damage suffered by countries as a result of climate change**. For an incredibly thorough rundown of what exactly the details are of the new loss and damage fund, see the third section of [this Carbon Brief article](#). (Side note: this article also describes in detail the last-minute negotiation process (the deal almost failed) and the different issues that had to be hashed out, which is a really interesting example of how international diplomacy plays out in practice (for example, [the EU proposed](#) at one point that large developing states like China (the world’s biggest emitter) pay into the fund, which [led developing states to accuse](#) the EU of trying to fragment the developing country (G77) + China bloc which had formed)). **Anyway, here are the basics of the COP27 loss and damage fund agreement (you can read the full 5-page resolution [here](#)):**

- Established a fund for responding to loss and damage whose mandate includes a focus on **addressing** (not preventing) loss and damage and setting up “new funding arrangements” to help
- Established a **“Transitional Committee”** (TC) to report back at COP28 with recommendations on how to “operationalize” the fund (how to actually put it into practice by deciding what structure and processes it should have) (note: for our purposes, the TC’s recommendations are only those it has issued by the end of January (if any))



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- Defined the fund as being established “to **assist developing countries** that are **particularly vulnerable (note the phrasing) to the adverse effects of climate change**” with “damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change”
- **Developed countries and international financial institutions (IFIs)** are “**urged**” to provide “enhanced and additional support” to loss and damage-reducing activities
- **No later than at COP 28, countries should “adopt” new “decisions” relating to the “new funding arrangements” of the loss and damage fund** based on the TC’s recommendations on structure (who is included?), governance (who makes funding decisions?), and funding (how will it be funded?)

Also on the loss and damage front, COP 27 saw progress when countries agreed to increase funding for the [“Santiago Network,”](#) a 3-year-old organization which developing countries can use to connect with overseas partners like NGOs or international development banks. Although expanding or reforming the Santiago Network is not generally regarded as a high priority, delegates at COP 28 may choose to make improvements to this loss-and-damage org. if they so choose.

What now?

After COP 27 concluded, the British think tank ODI [published an article](#) praising the COP27 fund agreement as a landmark achievement, but also acknowledging that **six crucial questions** about the fund had yet to be answered and had to be answered over the next year, including at COP28:

“1. What constitutes ‘loss and damage’? 2. How much loss and damage finance is needed? 3. Who will get the funding? 4. How will the funds be delivered? 5. Who will pay, and where will funding come from? 6. How will the fund be managed?”

These questions were left unanswered, and are now left to be answered and built upon in future COPs—as the agreement stipulated, **“decisions” regarding “new funding agreements” for the loss and damage fund should be adopted no later than at COP 28.**

“1. What constitutes ‘loss and damage’?”

[“Loss and damage”](#) in general refers to climate destruction that has already happened (the difference between them is that “loss” is permanent (a species extinction), whereas “damage” is temporary (an endangerment)). As ODI, the British think tank, argues, the COP27 agreement did not specify what exactly qualifies as a climate change-caused “loss and damage,” and, as a result, does not clarify how funding should be distributed across regions and across types of natural disasters. For example, should “slow-onset” damages, like rising sea levels, be given lower priority than “fast-onset disasters” like flash floods or heat waves, even if the country with the “slow-onset” disaster is poorer and needs the funds more? Should compensation for “economic” damages be given priority over compensation for “non-economic” damages (like loss of cultural heritage)?

“2. How much loss and damage finance [if any] is needed?”

Another thorny question involves the amount of loss and damage funds that should “fill the pool,” so to speak. As we will see later, many countries would instead prefer that more money be devoted to “a mosaic of solutions” including climate finance or poverty reduction programs instead of just loss and damage. At the same time, though, estimated losses from the Pakistan floods were over \$30 billion. ODI, for its part, suggests using data from [EM-DAT](#) (the International Disaster Database) or the [Sendai Framework for NDR](#) (which assesses natural disaster risk) to calculate an estimate for economic losses. One might also consult [international insurance brokers like AON](#) who put price tags on natural disasters to calculate insurance payouts.

“3. Who will get the funding (if needed)?”

Given that climate change presents an existential threat for some countries, particularly [Small Island Developing States \(SIDS\)](#), this is undoubtedly one of the

saves them but dooms another country. As one might expect, this issue was especially controversial at COP27, and [several significant last-minute wording changes](#) were made—the initial resolution applied to only the “most-vulnerable” nations, then “especially most-vulnerable nations,” which then amended to “particularly vulnerable” nations in the final draft to include nations like Pakistan and Nigeria. Still, though, the definition of **“particularly vulnerable”** remains a topic of debate—what about low-lying but wealthy states like the Seychelles,, or developed countries with developing territories (like France and French Guiana?)

“4. How should the funds be delivered [if at all]?”

Some, like the ODI, have suggested consulting institutions like the World Bank or IMF or quite possibly even channeling the funds only through the World Bank and IMF, going around the fund entirely. As the ODI indicates, the IMF often has rigorous standards for loaning to countries, which, with the World Bank, could be applied in this arena. (Although the IMF and World Bank are often accused of Western bias.)

5. Who will pay [if anyone] and where will funding come from [if anywhere]?

Another of the most controversial and hotly debated unresolved issues is the issue of contribution to the fund and the level of responsibility of developed nations for climate events—to what extent should individual countries, companies, or even individuals themselves be held responsible and forced to pay for climate reparations. As exhibited, the issue of forcing one country or a hyperspecific group of countries to take the blame is what alienated John Kerry and led him to believe that the idea of a loss and damage fund would be nonsensical. This interest by developed nations led to zero mentions of “liability” or “compensation” in the final agreement, as many countries with historically but not currently high emissions, like, say, the Netherlands, would have been on the hook. Many countries and observers like Mohammad Hanif, however, would ¹⁶

also like to see developed countries held liable for their actions instead of just “urged” to contribute what, if history is any indication, might end up being a paltry amount.

However, variety of alternative funding mechanisms have been proposed outside of just taking from countries’ coffers. Most notably, UN Sec. Gen. Antonio Guterres endorsed [a “windfall” tax on fossil fuel companies](#) which their host countries would collect and pay into the loss and damage fund. Other have suggested that the IMF could pay into the loss and damage fund by issuing [Special Drawing Rights \(SDRs; foreign currency reserves\)](#) to countries in need of loss and damage funds.

“6. How should the fund be managed [if at all]?”

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, UNFCCC party states must ensure that the loss and damage fund is a tool that is not manipulated for the purposes of corruption or embezzlement—how will the funds be used? How will effective oversight be applied? What constitutes a project to which loss and damage funds could go to—the rebuilding of a school after a massive forest fire, sure, but what about rebuilding a shoddily built school after a gusty day? Are there any other ways in which funds should be used other than **rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction?** Ultimately, it is necessary for the Transitional Committee and by extension the parties of COP 28 to resolve these issues in the coming months, whether by scrapping the COP27 fund altogether or building on it..

Alternatives to the loss and damage fund

It should be noted, however, that the COP27 loss and damage fund is not the only climate reparations policy which has been proposed. Several other policies have been proposed as more effective forms of reparations given by countries who are both **most responsible for** and **least affected** by climate change to those who are both the **least responsible** and **most affected** by it (instead of cash money.) I will “briefly” run down the options here:

A “mosaic of solutions” instead of a singular loss and damage fund

Developed nations at COPs in the past have historically advocated for a long laundry list of policies in order to aid countries that are most vulnerable to climate change, with loss and damage funds notably excluded from the list. According to Carbon Brief, [the EU’s “mosaic” approach in COP 27](#) (offered as an alternative to the loss and damage fund proposal) proposed measures such as **(1) increasing funding for extreme weather early warning systems that can reduce casualty risk; (2) reforming the “morally bankrupt” World Bank and the IMF** so that both development banks can do more low-interest loans to countries going through climate destruction (so that countries do not need to worry about debt distress if they keep getting hit by climate disasters), and **(3) strengthening** what is called the **“Global Shield,”** to which countries pledged \$250 million at COP27. [“The Global Shield,”](#) disappointingly, is not an actual Global Shield but instead is an international campaign to enact policies in world govts. revolving around **two** core themes: **(a) getting citizens in more countries to get climate (flood, wind, etc.) risk insurance,** and **(b) improving social safety nets** around the world (by improving healthcare and shelter systems and the like). According to advocates, these two policies when enacted together are ultimately more effective than merely establishing a loss and damage compensation fund, because they better prepare countries for future crises instead of merely a focus on recovering from past crises. It should be noted, though, that [according to Carbon Brief](#) “insurance has a long history of being pushed in the UN process as an alternative to loss-and-damage funding.”

Climate finance, green investment, and the [“\\$100 billion pledge”](#)

Another set of policies which have been pushed by developed nations in recent years as better and more efficient uses of their funds are climate finance and green investment. Climate finance is just an umbrella term for any sort of investment or financial decision whose goal is to reduce emissions or otherwise increase our resilience to climate change. Decarbonization and “green investment” is the biggest example of this—for example, a country decides to put its money toward the building of a solar farm in a developing nation, or decides to divest its sovereign wealth fund from fossil fuel stocks, or end its fossil fuel subsidies. The biggest example of this is the [Green Climate Fund](#), in which 18 developed countries in 2009 promised to give \$100 billion a year to developing

countries by 2020 to help them develop in a “clean” way by bankrolling renewable energy projects to help them achieve green power grids, industrial sectors, and agricultural sectors. According to the Green Climate Fund website, their projects have helped developing countries avoid 2.6 billion tons of carbon emissions. For advocates of climate finance, these actions are more effective climate reparations because they help the most vulnerable while also reducing the likelihood of climate disaster. In essence, advocates of this strategy believe that \$100 billion spent proactively helping developing nations decarbonize trumps the same \$100 billion spent on climate loss and damage projects.

It should be noted, though, that the \$100 billion dollar promise was **a failed promise**: developed countries only gave about **\$80 billion** a year by 2020, and even then, developing countries would need more, much, much more, in order to most effectively decarbonize and prevent warming of 2.0C above pre-industrial levels..

Poverty reduction and refugee resettlement

Finally, one method to effectively establish climate reparations without officially establishing them, as argued by advocates, is simply to reduce poverty and not to focus on decarbonization. The thinking goes, [as Vijaya Ramachandran argued in an April 2022 Foreign Policy article](#), that the World Bank and IMF should not prioritize clean energy when they are deciding what projects and countries to invest in, nor should they focus on loss and damage funds—instead, they should **simply invest in poverty reduction programs** like building hospitals or better housing or clean water access. If people are healthier and less poor, then they will be more likely to survive climate change, according to Ramachandran, and helping people adapt to climate change is just as important as helping mitigate it. Therefore, Ramachandran argues that IFIs and developed countries should return to the basics when it comes to climate reparations; that the best form of climate reparations would be normal reparations designed to lift people in the developing world out of poverty. In a similar vein, [Táiwó and Cibralic, also writing in Foreign Policy](#), argue that “a reparations-based refugee system,” in which Western countries treated it like an “obligation” to take in climate refugees whom their carbon emissions dislocated, would best “address retrenched inequalities” and lessen the dislocating effects of climate change.



Postscript and final thoughts

In sum, the question of how to best administer climate reparations, or whether to administer them at all, is the question which is presented to delegates as we gather for the 28th annual Conference of Parties. Depending on one's stance, delegates can decide to either build on the progress toward a Loss and Damage Fund made at the last COP, destroy that progress, or go in a new direction entirely by pursuing climate finance or poverty reduction.

Delegates can decide to work within the blocs which seem preassigned to them or create new blocs entirely. Delegates can decide to move toward an operational Loss and Damage Fund with a funding mechanism of their choice in place, or delegates can decide that the prevailing winds of the time demand a different solution. The choice is theirs.



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Further reading



[United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change \(1992\)](#)

[Draft text of the COP27 resolution establishing the COP27 Loss and Damage Fund \(and other funding arrangements\)](#)

[Earth Negotiations Bulletin](#) (Helpful website with an archive of daily recaps from past UN climate change conferences)

[CAT Climate Target Update Tracker](#) (See if your country has updated its NDC or not)

[Nationally Determined Contributions Registry | UNFCCC](#) (More detailed version of the above link where you can look at your country's latest NDC)

[Understanding Loss and Damage](#) (Really helpful explainer about the concept of “loss and damage” from the European Parliament website)

[COP27: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Sharm el-Sheikh](#) (Carbon Brief)

[Timeline: The struggle over ‘loss and damage’ in UN climate talks](#) (Carbon Brief)

[Operationalising the new ‘Loss and Damage’ fund: six questions](#) (ODI)

[List of past “negotiating groups” at COPs](#) (Wikipedia)

